11:45–12:45: Beate Krickel, "Self-Image-Defense, Repression, and the Meaning of 'Unconscious'"

12:45-2:15: Lunch

2:15-3:15: Sarah Robins, "The Mnemonic Puzzle"

3:15-4:15: Hizabeth Schechter, "Self-Consciousness in the Split-Brain Subject"

4:15-4:30: Coffee Break

4:30-5:30: Fred Adams, "Gobal Aphasia and the Language of Thought"

Fred Adams (U. of Delaware), "Global Aphasia and the Language of Thought" In 1975 Jerry Fodor proposed that there must be a Language of Thought (LO.T., in his book of that title). In 1987 he re-iterated his daim that there is a language of thought. His arguments are largely theoretical based upon inference to the best explanation for our productive and systematic cognitive abilities. However, is there any independent empirical evidence for the existence of a language of thought? Recent studies of persons with global aphasia might well be empirical support for Fodor's claims. I will present some data from the work of Rosemary Varley who studies the cognitive abilities of persons with global aphasia. I will give her criteria for what she calls "agrammaticism" which define what she deems a loss of significant linguistic capacity. Then I will explain the kinds of cognitive capacity demonstrated by individuals with global aphasia. Varley's own conclusions are that there are two separate systems at work in the human mind—a linguistic system and a cognitive system. She explains that she believes these two systems come apart in subjects with global aphasia. In these subjects, their cognitive systems take over and allow them to perform as well as anyone on many cognitive tasks. If she is right, her work may supply important empirical support for the existence of a language of thought (LO.T.).

Ken Aizawa (Rutgers U., Newark), "Polger and Shapiro's Concepts of Realization" Polger and Shapiro have two principal concepts of realization: an individual being a member of a kind is a species of realization and a kind being a member of a kind is a species of realization. This duality in their thinking has important ramifications for some of their other views and for their critiques of the work of others. For one thing, by their own lights, Polger and Shapiro should not count kind membership as a realization relation. For another, their critique of Dimensioned realization fails to engage that view.

Robert Cummins (Emeritus, U. of California, Davis), "Three Ways of Spilling Philosophy OR: **Phi**losophy's Three Deadly Sins"

Philosophers—especially philosophers who take science seriously – need to be cautious of three aspects of mainstream philosophical methodology that threaten to undermine their project. (1) Reliance on intuitions and reflective equilibrium. (2) Semantic Poaching, and (3) Puzzle philosophy. Instead, philosophy should seek to situate the science in a conceptual framework that helps us to understand its implications.

Heather Demarest (U. of Colorado, Boulder), "Relativistic Persons: What Special and General Relativity Can Tell Us about Who We Are"

I present some arguments from special and general relativity that suggest people do not exist at times, except perhaps derivatively. Special relativity teaches us that there are many incompatible--but equally good--ways to foliate spacetime into spaces at times. One consequence is that there are many incompatible--but equally good--ways to foliate brains into brain-states-at-times. I present the results as a dilemma: either people do not exist

relativity teaches us that time objectively moves more slowly closer to gravitational objects. This difference in temporal rate implies that there can be no consistent persons-at-times.

Zoe Drayson (U. of California, Davis), "The Fragmented Self: Varieties of Implicit Cognition" The prediction and explanation of human action seems to require the assumption of a rational self; in particular, the assumption that the self has a single consistent set of beliefs. In some cases, however, philosophers and psychologists advocate thinking of the self as fragmented or compartmentalized rather than unified. In this paper, I argue that this talk of mental fragmentation is often ambiguous between (1) the rational fragmentation of the unified self, and (2) the causal or informational fragmentation of the mechanisms that realize the self. Rational fragmentation (1) is a strategy (associated with e.g. Lewis, Stalnaker) used to argue that seemingly irrational agents are in fact rational. Causal fragmentation (2) is a strategy (associated with e.g. modularity theorists, dual-process theorists) for showing how the mechanisms that cause rational action can also cause irrational action. I explore the relationship between these two forms of fragmentation and emphasize the importance of distinguishing them, particularly in the current debates over implicit bias and belief-discordant behavior.

Carrie Figdor (U. of Iowa), "Audience Participation Meets Epistemology: A Model of Active Processing of Testimony"

Beate

Rob Rupert (U. of Colorado, Boulder), "Epistemic Value in the Subpersonal Vale" A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology concerns the value of knowledge, and, in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true belief. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be found at the personal level, the level at which states of whole persons, as such, appear. We take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned status. We argue that subpersonal states play a significant – arguably, primary – role in much epistemically relevant cognition and thus constitute a domain in which we might reasonably expect to locate the "missing source" of epistemic value, beyond the value attached to mere true belief. We then identify two specific ways – both to do with the subpersonal fixation and maintenance of beliefs – in which the subpersonal appears to serve as a source of epistemic value. (This is joint work with J. Adam Carter, Glasgow.)

Bizabeth Schechter (Washington U. of St. Louis), "Self-Consciousness in the Split-Brain Subject" Split-brain surgery results in dual consciousness and dual agency: one center of conscious agency associated with each cerebral hemisphere. These claims, while controversial, have received much philosophical attention. Philosophers have seldom explicitly considered the structure of self-consciousness after split-brain surgery, however. In this paper, I argue, first, that after the corpus callosum that connects them is fully sectioned, the two hemispheres are associated with distinct centers of self-conscious cognition. On the other hand there is nonetheless something about the operation of self-consciousness after split-brain surgery that makes each split-brain subject more like one of us than like two of us together.

Larry Shapiro (U. of Wisconsin, Madison), "What Is It Like to Feel Like a Self?" The advent of virtual reality technology has created new opportunities for investigating the phenomenology of selfhood. Drawing on this research, Blanke and Metzinger (2009) offer the minimal phenomenal self (MPS) as an analysis of the feeling of selfhood. In this paper I darify an imprecision in the statement of conditions for minimal phenomenal selfhood and argue for an even more minimal conception of selves. I also point out a number of ambiguities in the questionnaires that provide data about feelings of selfhood, explaining how they undermine