Published: Oct. 1, 2012 By

Brian Talbot, an instructor of philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder. Photo by Noah Larsen.

In certain political and religious circles, the notion of moral relativism 鈥 that there is no objective 鈥渞ight鈥 or wrong, only individual opinions 鈥 is not just anathema, not merely abhorrent. It is the very root of decadence and the collapse of civilization.

鈥淲hat鈥檚 right for you may not be right for me,鈥 relativists might argue, or 鈥淲ho are we to judge others鈥 actions?鈥

The concept doesn鈥檛 have much support in the world of philosophy, either, but philosophers tend to be more 鈥 philosophical when approaching it.

But for those who teach ethics at the college level, a dedicated 鈥渟tudent relativist鈥 can present difficulties in the classroom, whether it鈥檚 initiating a debate over whether there should be a debate over ethics or attempting to undermine the very foundations of thousands of years of human philosophical debate.

And that can be disruptive, says Brian Talbot, an instructor of philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder. He recalls one young woman in a philosophy of law class who all but declared the class a waste of time. The law, she said, should be whatever a lawmaker thinks it should be.

鈥淭here are hundreds of years of thought on the law and what the law should be,鈥 Talbot says, 鈥渁nd this student wanted to switch to a debate over whether we should even be having a debate.鈥

In many situations, 鈥渞elativism鈥 makes perfect sense, such as 鈥渢he moral status of pulling someone鈥檚 tooth,鈥 as Talbot notes: Did the patient consent? Is the tooth really rotten? Is the tooth-puller actually a dentist, as he or she claims to be?

But when philosophy and ethics teachers encounter more fundamental 鈥渟tudent relativists鈥 鈥 there is no good or bad, only opinion 鈥 how should they deal with the situation? Such students, after all, can 鈥渞eally throw a class off and sidetrack the discussions.鈥

In 鈥淪tudent Relativism: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb,鈥 published in the June issue of the journal Teaching Philosophy, Talbot argues against the common practice of trying 鈥渢o convince students to reject moral relativism.鈥

Instead, teachers should 鈥渢reat students who accept relativism just as one would treat students who accept other moral theories one disagrees with.鈥

In other words, Talbot believes in encouraging student relativists to vigorously engage their belief, just as they would any other moral philosophy.

鈥淚 don鈥檛 have a particular view I want students to adopt. I don鈥檛 have it all worked out,鈥 he says. 鈥淏ut I do want to 鈥榠ndoctrinate鈥 them into seeing the need to think about important questions, the need to be rigorous thinkers, and that being a good person is important 鈥 whatever that is.鈥

As he writes in the article, 鈥渆ven moral relativists should engage with ethics in the ways we teach in our classrooms.鈥

Such an approach, Talbot argues, is more respectful of students and achieves the goal of getting them to think seriously about their belief rather than giving them a reason to tune out or undermine the class.

鈥淭hey don鈥檛 need philosophers to tell them what the answers are. What they need is to learn to think for themselves on these questions and talk to other people, go to other sources,鈥 he says.

It鈥檚 an important point, Talbot says, because teachers are more likely to find relativists in a college philosophy class than in the world at large.

鈥淭here is something about being a college student that is conducive to moral relativism,鈥 he says, including students鈥 relative paucity of life experience. 鈥淚 think most students give up moral relativism anyway, but they need to come to that on their own. 鈥 My college self would not recognize me now.鈥